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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1981, a stranger abducted six-year-old Adam Walsh from a department
store and murdered him.1  His parents, John and Rev Walsh, founded the
National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, becoming high-profile
proponents of laws protecting children from exploitation and abduction.2  On
July 27, 2006, twenty-five years after Adam’s abduction, President George W.
Bush signed into law the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006
(AWA).3  Prior to the enactment of the AWA, Congress regulated state legisla-
tion pertaining to sex offender registration and community notification under
the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender
Registration Act of 1994 (commonly known as the Wetterling Act).4  The Wet-
terling Act required states to establish registries for sex offenders or risk finan-
cial penalties.5  Subsequently, Congress passed Megan’s Law in 1996, which
required states to make these registries available to the public.6  By enacting the
AWA, Congress intended to better protect the public from sex offenders who
elude registration by moving from one state to another.7  To accomplish this
* Juris Doctor Candidate, 2011, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las
Vegas.
1 Brittany Enniss, Quickly Assuaging Public Fear: How the Well-Intended Adam Walsh Act
Led to Unintended Consequences, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 697, 701.
2 Id.; see also Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, The White House, President Signs
H.R. 4472, the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (July 27, 2006), http://
georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/07/20060727-6.html [hereinafter
White House Press Release]  (describing John and Rev Walsh as “advocates for missing
children . . . . [who have] helped combat child abduction and exploitation across [the]
country”).
3 Enniss, supra note 1, at 702; White House Press Release, supra note 2.
4 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2006); see also Amy Baron-Evans, Still Time to Rethink the Mis-
guided Approach of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 20 FED. SENT’G.
REP. 357, 358 (2008); Lara Geer Farley, The Adam Walsh Act: The Scarlet Letter of the
Twenty-First Century, 47 WASHBURN L.J. 471, 475 (2008); Jacob Frumkin, Perennial Pun-
ishment? Why the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act Needs Reconsideration, 17
J.L. & POL’Y 313, 313 n.12 (2008).
5 Phoebe Geer, Justice Served? The High Cost of Juvenile Sex Offender Registration, DEV.
MENTAL HEALTH L., July 2008, at 33, 35-36.
6 Id. at 36.
7 White House Press Release, supra note 2; United States v. Hinen, 487 F. Supp. 2d 747,
752-53 (W.D. Va. 2007).
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goal, the AWA provides for a national sex offender registry, including the Dru
Sjodin National Sex Offender Public Website,8 increased federal penalties for
crimes against children, task forces on Internet crimes against children, and a
national child abuse registry.9
Title I of the AWA, the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act
(SORNA), requires states to comply “substantially” with its provisions within
three years of enactment, or risk losing 10 percent of federal funding under the
Byrne Justice Assistance Grant.10  This grant consists of funds usually allo-
cated toward law enforcement and crime prevention.11  The AWA established
the Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending, Registering, and
Tracking (SMART) Office,12 which is authorized to grant two one-year exten-
sions to states requiring more time to comply with SORNA.13  Nearly every
state has applied for both extensions because of various barriers they have
encountered in implementing SORNA.14
States’ attempts to comply substantially with the provisions in SORNA
have failed for a variety of reasons.15  First, SORNA is arguably unconstitu-
tional under both federal and state constitutions because it gives the Attorney
General of the United States the power to mandate the retroactive application of
registration requirements to sex offenders.16  Accordingly, states have faced
challenges to legislation implementing SORNA in state and federal courts.
Second, SORNA requires states to use an offender classification system that
hinders them from monitoring the most-dangerous offenders who have the
highest risk of committing another sex offense, thus decreasing public safety
and needlessly wasting limited state resources.17  Finally, the financial cost to
8 The website is named “in honor of 22-year-old college student Dru Sjodin of Grand Forks,
North Dakota, a young woman who was kidnapped and murdered by a sex offender who
crossed state lines to commit his crime.” About the Dru Sjodin National Sex Offender Public
Website, U.S. DEP’T JUST., http://www.nsopw.gov/Core/About.Aspx (last visited Mar. 29,
2011).
9 White House Press Release, supra note 2.
10 Baron-Evans, supra note 4, at 357; U.S. Dep’t of Justice, The National Guidelines for
Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 75 Fed. Reg. 38030, 38047 (Jul. 2, 2008) [here-
inafter SORNA Guidelines].
11 42 U.S.C. § 3750 (2006) (naming program); see also id. § 3751(a) (describing programs
the grant may fund).
12 Id. § 16945(a).
13 SMART General FAQs, OFF. SEX OFFENDER SENT’G, MONITORING, APPREHENDING, REG-
ISTERING, & TRACKING, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/smart/faq_general.htm (last visited Mar.
29, 2011); see also About SMART, OFF. SEX OFFENDER SENT’G, MONITORING, APPRE-
HENDING, REGISTERING, & TRACKING, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/smart/about.htm (last vis-
ited Mar. 29, 2011).
14 See generally Sex Offender Notification and Registration Act (SORNA): Barriers to
Timely Compliance by States: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and
Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009) [hereinafter Barriers
to Timely Compliance Hearing].
15 See generally id.
16 Applicability of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 28 C.F.R. § 72.3
(2010).
17 Baron-Evans, supra note 4, at 357.
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states of substantially implementing the provisions of SORNA is far greater
than the federal funding lost by non-compliance.18
For these reasons, Nevada should abandon attempts to comply substan-
tially with SORNA.  Instead, Nevada should adopt only a few (if any) of
SORNA’s provisions to amend its existing sex offender registration scheme.  In
doing so, Nevada would forfeit some annual federal funding,19 but would ulti-
mately save millions of dollars as well as further the goal of keeping its citizens
safe from the most-predatory sex offenders with the highest risk of recidivism.
Part II of this Note discusses the historical background of the AWA.  It
provides an introduction to the provisions in SORNA, reviews states’
approaches to compliance with SORNA and legal challenges to SORNA’s pro-
visions across the United States, and provides an overview of Nevada’s
attempts to comply substantially with SORNA’s provisions.  Part III analyzes
the challenges to and benefits of states complying with SORNA, including
issues of practicality and maintaining state autonomy, the modified tier classifi-
cation system, the issues associated with juvenile sex offender registration and
reporting requirements, and the costs associated with implementing and main-
taining a national registration system.  Finally, Part IV proposes a plan for
future sex offender registration and community-notification legislation in
Nevada.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE ADAM WALSH ACT
A. An Introduction to SORNA’s Provisions
SORNA, the part of the AWA that regulates sex offender registration and
community notification, requires states to classify sex offenders into three tiers
based exclusively on the type of conviction.20  Currently, approximately one-
half of the states, including Nevada, use a risk-assessment model—which con-
siders other factors in addition to the conviction type to classify sex offenders
into a tier-based system.21
Under SORNA, a Tier III sex offender is considered the highest-risk
offender and is one whose offense is punishable by imprisonment for more than
one year and is “comparable to or more severe” than “aggravated sexual abuse
or sexual abuse,” or “abusive sexual contact . . . against a minor” who is
younger than thirteen years of age.22  The offender may also be classified as a
Tier III offender if the offense involved kidnapping of a minor, unless the kid-
18 JUSTICE POLICY INST., WHAT WILL IT COST STATES TO COMPLY WITH THE SEX OFFENDER
REGISTRY AND NOTIFICATION ACT? 1-2 (2008), available at http://www.justicepolicy.org/
images/upload/08-08_FAC_SORNACosts_JJ.pdf.
19 See Baron-Evans, supra note 4, at 357.
20 42 U.S.C. § 16911(2)-(4) (2006).
21 Baron-Evans, supra note 4, at 357; Nevada Sex Offender Registry: Definitions and Expla-
nations, NEV. DEP’T PUB. SAFETY, http://www.nvsexoffenders.gov/Definitions.aspx (last
visited Mar. 29, 2011).  Many other states “employ broad community notification, publiciz-
ing the location of all sex offenders without regard to their risk.”  Jill S. Levenson & David
A. D’Amora, Social Policies Designed to Prevent Sexual Violence: The Emperor’s New
Clothes?, 18 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 168, 171 (2007).
22 42 U.S.C. § 16911(4)(A).
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napper is a parent or guardian, or if the offense occurred after the offender
became a Tier II offender.23
A Tier II sex offender is defined as:
[One] whose offense is punishable by imprisonment for more than 1 year
and—
(A) is comparable to or more severe than the following offenses, when committed
against a minor, or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such an offense against a
minor:
(i) sex trafficking (as described in section 1591 of title 18);
(ii) coercion and enticement (as described in section 2422 (b) of Title 18);
(iii) transportation with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity (as described
in section 2423 (a)) of Title 18;
(iv) abusive sexual contact (as described in section 2244 of Title 18);
(B) involves—
(i) use of a minor in a sexual performance;
(ii) solicitation of a minor to practice prostitution; or
(iii) production or distribution of child pornography; or
(C) occurs after the offender becomes a tier I sex offender.24
A Tier I sex offender is one who is not classified as a Tier II or Tier III
offender.25  According to U.S. Department of Justice’s Final Guidelines for
SORNA, Tier I offenders include those who (1) commit offenses “not punisha-
ble by imprisonment for more than one year,” (2) “whose . . . offense is the
receipt or possession of child pornography,” or (3) commit sexual assault
against an adult involving “sexual contact but not a completed or attempted
sexual act.”26
States must list on their sex offender registry websites Tier I sex offenders
who have committed specified crimes against minors.27  Additionally, SORNA
requires offenders to provide the states with more information to list in the
national registry and on the registry websites.28  Such information includes the
name and address of any employer for whom the offender works, any school in
which the offender enrolls, and a description of the offender’s vehicle and
license plate number.29  However, states do maintain some discretion over
which information is exempt from disclosure on the registry website.  For
instance, a state can choose not to post the name of the offender’s employer or
school, or information about a Tier I offender as long as the offender did not
commit a specific crime against a minor.30  Moreover, SORNA requires the
offender to provide his social security number, a DNA sample, and finger-
23 Id. § 16911(4)(B)-(C).
24 Id. § 16911(3).
25 Id. § 16911(2).
26 SORNA Guidelines, supra note 10, at 38047.
27 42 U.S.C. §16917(a)(3) (requiring states to register sex offenders); id. § 16918(a), (c)(1)
(requiring jurisdictions to post their registries online, with the option to exclude Tier 1
offenders whose offense was not against a minor).
28 Id. § 16918(a).
29 Id. § 16914(a) (requiring the offender to provide more information for the registry); id.
§ 16918(a) (requiring the state to post some of that information on the Internet); see also
Nevada Sex Offender Registry, supra note 21.
30 42 U.S.C. § 16918(c)(1)-(3).
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prints.31  The state, however, must not post an offender’s social security num-
ber on its sex offender registry website under any circumstances.32
SORNA also changes the time periods for sex offender registration.33  On
February 28, 2007, the United States Attorney General issued an interim order
mandating that SORNA apply to “all sex offenders, including sex offenders
convicted of the offense for which registration is required prior to the enact-
ment of [SORNA].”34  Under this legislation, Tier I offenders must register for
a period of fifteen years, which the state can reduce by five years if the offender
meets the “clean record” requirements for a period of ten years.35  An offender
maintains a “clean record” by:
(A) not being convicted of any offense for which imprisonment for more than 1 year
may be imposed;
(B) not being convicted of any sex offense;
(C) successfully completing any periods of supervised release, probation, and parole;
and
(D) successfully completing of [sic] an appropriate sex offender treatment program
certified by a jurisdiction or by the Attorney General.36
Tier II offenders must register for twenty-five years.37  Tier III offenders, as
well as Tier II offenders who commit sex offenses punishable by imprisonment
for more than one year during their registration period, must register for life.38
A Tier III offender who was adjudicated delinquent is also eligible for a reduc-
tion in the registration period if he maintains a clean record for twenty-five
years.39
SORNA requires offenders to register in person periodically, depending
on the offender’s tier.40  Tier I sex offenders must appear in person to verify
their information with the registration office and to allow the jurisdiction to
take a new photograph of them every year.41  Tier II offenders must verify their
information in person every six months, and Tier III offenders must verify their
information in person every three months.42  Jurisdictions must also take photo-
graphs of Tier II and Tier III offenders during in-person verification.43
SORNA also applies to juvenile sex offenders who are older than fourteen
years of age and have committed an offense “comparable to or more severe
than aggravated sexual abuse,” or “was an attempt or conspiracy to commit
31 Id. § 16914(a)(2), (b)(5)-(6).
32 Id. § 16918(b)(2).
33 Id. § 16915(a).
34 Applicability of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 28 C.F.R. § 72.3
(2010).
35 42 U.S.C. § 16915(a)(1), (b)(2)(A), (b)(3)(A).
36 Id. § 16915(b)(1).
37 Id. § 16915(a)(2).
38 Id. § 16915(a)(3); see also id. § 16911(4)(C) (defining a Tier III offender as “a sex
offender whose offense is punishable by imprisonment for more than 1 year and . . . occurs
after the offender becomes a Tier II sex offender”).
39 Id. § 16915(b)(2)(B), (b)(3)(B).
40 Id. § 16916.
41 Id. § 16916(1).
42 Id. § 16916(2)-(3).
43 Id.
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such an offense.”44  These juvenile sex offenders must comply with the same
registration and reporting requirements as adult offenders.45
B. Congress’s Power to Pass the Adam Walsh Act
Although enacting and regulating criminal acts in violation of state law is
within the scope of the states’ powers, Congress has repeatedly used its powers
under the Commerce Clause to enact sex offender registration and notification
laws that are applicable to the states.46  After Congress enacted Megan’s Law,
which amended the Wetterling Act and required states to use stricter sex
offender registration standards or lose federal funding, all states chose to adopt
a form of Megan’s Law.47  Congress also used its Commerce Clause powers to
enact the AWA in 2006.48
SORNA has faced constitutional challenges in which petitioners have
argued that such legislation is not within Congress’s powers under the Com-
merce Clause.49  The courts’ responses to these legal challenges have varied,
although the most decisions have upheld SORNA’s constitutionality.50  For
example, in United States v. Akers, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Indiana held that SORNA was not an unconstitutional
exercise of the Commerce Clause powers because, the court reasoned, regulat-
ing interstate travel of sex offenders is rationally related to the goal of protect-
ing the public from these offenders.51
Even decisions holding SORNA unconstitutional have been overturned.
Both the United States District Courts for the Middle District of Florida52 and
44 42 U.S.C. § 16911(8).
45 Ennis, supra note 1, at 703; 42 U.S.C. § 16911(8).
46 Anne Marie Atkinson, The Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA): An
Unconstitutional Infringement of States’ Rights Under the Commerce Clause, 3 CHARLES-
TON L. REV. 573, 574 (2009).  Under the Commerce Clause, Congress has the power “to
regulate Commerce . . . among the several States . . . .”  U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3.
47 Atkinson, supra note 46, at 574.
48 Id. at 575; Wayne A. Logan, Criminal Justice Federalism and National Sex Offender
Policy, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 51, 88 (2008).
49 See Atkinson, supra note 46, at 586-87.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 587-88.  The court in Akers relied on the decision in United States v. Dixon, and
concluded that “SORNA is substantially related to the public’s protection from sex offenders
whose interstate travel may frustrate any one State’s ability to monitor.”  United States v.
Akers, No. 3:07-CR-00086(01) RM, 2008 WL 914493, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 3, 2008) (citing
United States v. Dixon, No. 3:07-CR-72(01) RM, 2007 WL 4553720, at *5 (N.D. Ind. Dec.
18, 2007)).
52 United States v. Powers, 544 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1336 (M.D. Fla. 2008).  The court specif-
ically held:
If an individual’s mere unrelated travel in interstate commerce is sufficient to establish a Com-
merce Clause nexus with purely local conduct, then virtually all criminal activity would be sub-
ject to the power of the federal government.  Surely our founding fathers did not contemplate
such a broad view of federalism.  Accordingly, the Court finds that the adoption of the statute
under which Defendant is charged violates Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause and is,
therefore, unconstitutional.
Id.
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the District of Montana53 held that SORNA is unconstitutional under the Com-
merce Clause.54  The courts reasoned that SORNA’s provisions regulating
interstate travel of sex offenders do not “substantially affect” interstate com-
merce, and that the connections Congress attempted to make between sex
offender travel and interstate commerce were tenuous at best.55  However, the
Ninth and the Eleventh Circuits overturned the district court decisions from
their respective jurisdictions, ultimately holding that Congress did not unconsti-
tutionally abuse its Commerce Clause powers by enacting SORNA.56
Furthermore, some sex offenders have argued that Congress’s enactment
of SORNA violates the states’ reservation of powers under the Tenth Amend-
ment of the Constitution.57  In United States v. Burkey, the petitioner argued
that SORNA violates the Tenth Amendment because it amounts to Congress
commandeering state officials.58  Although states are not forced to comply sub-
stantially with SORNA, but rather are given financial incentives to do so, they
are still required to register those sex offenders who are obligated to do so since
SORNA’s enactment.  In other words, those sex offenders who move between
states are still required to register under SORNA even if the state itself has not
substantially complied.59  The United States District Court for the District of
Nevada ultimately held that SORNA does not violate the states’ reservation of
powers under the Tenth Amendment.60  Judge Jones reasoned that the statute
“does not compel states to adopt registration systems in compliance with
SORNA, but only requires sex offenders to register and update their registration
when they travel in interstate commerce.”61  Because the Adam Walsh Act
only provides financial incentives to compel states to comply with SORNA, it
does not violate the Tenth Amendment.62
53 United States v. Waybright, 561 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1157 (D. Mont. 2008) (“I agree with
Waybright’s claim that enactment of 42 U.S.C. § 16913, which requires all sex offenders to
register regardless of whether they travel in interstate commerce, is not a valid exercise of
Congress’ power under the Constitution.  I therefore declare 42 U.S.C. § 16913
unconstitutional.”).
54 Atkinson, supra note 46, at 591-94.
55 Id. at 592, 594.
56 United States v. George, 579 F.3d 962, 966-67 (9th Cir. 2009).  The Eleventh Circuit, in
United States v. Powers, 562 F.3d 1342, 1344 (11th Cir. 2009), relied upon on one of its
earlier decisions, where the Court stated: “SORNA does no more than employ Congress’
lawful commerce power to prohibit the use of channels or instrumentalities of commerce for
harmful purposes.”  United States v. Ambert, 561 F.3d 1202, 1211 (11th Cir. 2009).
57 See, e.g., United States v. Burkey, No. 2:08-cr-00145-RJC-PAL, 2009 WL 1616564, at
*27 (D. Nev. June 8, 2009).  The Tenth Amendment dictates that “[t]he powers not dele-
gated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved
to the States respectively, or to the people.”  U.S. CONST. amend. X.
58 Burkey, 2009 WL 1616564, at *27.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.  For another example of Congress applying financial pressures to encourage state
compliance with federal law, see South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211-12 (1987), where
the Supreme Court held that Congress did not violate the Tenth Amendment by withholding
5 percent of federal highway funds if states did not comply with the National Minimum
Drinking Age Amendment.
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C. States’ Attempts to Comply with SORNA
Thus far, Ohio, Delaware, Florida, and South Dakota, are the only states to
meet the standard of substantial compliance with SORNA.63  Ohio passed Sen-
ate Bill 10 and Senate Bill 97 in June 2007, and the Ohio Attorney General’s
Office announced in September 2009 that Ohio had become the first state to
reach substantial compliance with SORNA.64  In a press release, Ohio Attorney
General Richard Corday stated his belief in the need for a national registration
system: “Taking deliberate steps to provide a common foundation for all the
registration systems throughout the United States allows our families to make
the most effective use of the information those systems provide.”65
However, since the implementation of SORNA guidelines, the Ohio fed-
eral and state courts have faced several legal challenges to the bills.66  Two
county judges ruled that Senate Bill 10 violated the Ohio Constitution because
it applies to sex offenders retroactively, but the Fifth District Court of Appeals
later overturned the decisions.67  In State v. Bodyke, three Ohio sex offenders
contested their recent re-classification as Tier III offenders, after having been
classified differently by the courts at the time of conviction.68  Attorneys
argued to the Ohio Supreme Court that Senate Bill 10 would violate the consti-
tutional rights of 26,000 Ohioans because of its retroactive application.69  On
June 3, 2010, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that the re-classification of sex
offenders under SORNA’s new tier system by the state attorney general vio-
lated the separation of powers doctrine, because the courts had already classi-
fied the offenders through final judgments.70  One Richland County assistant
63 Ohio was the first state to comply with SORNA.  Press Release, Office of Justice Pro-
grams, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Announces First Two Jurisdictions to
Implement Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (Sept. 23, 2009), http://
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/newsroom/pressreleases/2009/SMART09154.htm [hereinafter Ohio
Press Release] (announcing Ohio and the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reser-
vation as the first two jurisdictions to comply).  On May 6, 2010, Delaware became the
second state to substantially comply.  Press Release, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Dep’t
of Justice, Justice Department Announces Fourth Jurisdiction to Implement Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Act (May 6, 2010), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/newsroom/press-
releases/2010/SMART10065.htm.  On May 18, 2010, Florida became the third state to sub-
stantially comply.  Press Release, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice
Department Announces Fifth Jurisdiction to Implement Sex Offender Registration and Noti-
fication Act (May 18, 2010), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/newsroom/pressreleases/2010/
SMART10072.htm.  On September 10, 2010, South Dakota became the fourth state to sub-
stantially comply.  Press Release, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice
Department Announces Sixth Jurisdiction to Implement Sex Offender Registration and Noti-
fication Act (Sept. 10, 2010), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/newsroom/pressreleases/2010/
SMART10120.htm [hereinafter South Dakota Press Release].
64 Ohio Press Release, supra note 63.
65 Id.
66 See James Nash, Lawyers Fight Law on Sex Offenders, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Ohio),
Nov. 5, 2009, at 1B.
67 Area News Briefs: 2 Sex Offender Cases to be Reviewed, MANSFIELD NEWS J. (Ohio),
Dec. 17, 2009, at A3.
68 State v. Bodyke, 933 N.E.2d 753, 756, 756 n.1 (Ohio 2010).
69 Nash, supra note 66.
70 Bodyke, 933 N.E.2d at 768.
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prosecutor opined that Ohio state courts will likely continue to receive these
types of challenges to the newly amended sex offender registration scheme.71
Other states, including Nevada, that have attempted to meet the federal
guidelines have faced major barriers to complying with SORNA.  Some of
these challenges include the costs associated with implementation, the need for
substantial revision of existing state laws, disagreement with the tier classifica-
tion system, and expensive legal challenges.72  In April 2009, SEARCH, The
National Consortium for Justice Information and Statistics (SEARCH) con-
ducted a survey of forty-seven states to determine each state’s plans for
SORNA compliance.73  Although not a single state that responded to the sur-
vey was in a position to comply with SORNA by the July 2009 deadline, nearly
all of the states had already asked or planned to ask for an extension for com-
pliance from the SMART office.74  Aside from Ohio, Florida, and Delaware,
all other forty-seven states applied for and received extensions that will expire
on July 27, 2011.75
It appears that states are still attempting to comply substantially with
SORNA despite the numerous barriers they face.76  Among the many concerns
about implementing SORNA’s provisions are: (1) its treatment of juvenile sex
offenders, perceived by many as overly punitive, and (2) constitutional chal-
lenges, including potential violations of the Ex Post Facto clause and procedu-
ral due process.
1. Juvenile Sex Offenders
The SEARCH survey found that the most common complaint from states
about compliance with the SORNA guidelines is the reporting and registration
requirements applicable to juvenile offenders, a concern that twenty-three out
of the forty-seven surveyed states cited.77  Recently, in United States v. Juve-
nile Male, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held
SORNA’s application to juveniles unconstitutional.78  There, a thirteen-year-
old defendant had “engaged in non-consensual sexual acts with a ten-year-old
child” for a period of two years.79  The court sentenced the defendant to two
years in a detention center in 2005, “followed by supervised release until his
71 Area News Briefs, supra note 67.
72 NAT’L CONSORTIUM FOR JUSTICE INFO. & STATISTICS, SEARCH SURVEY ON STATE COM-
PLIANCE WITH THE SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION ACT (SORNA) 2
(2009), available at http://www.search.org/files/pdf/SORNA-StateComplianceSurvey2009.
pdf; Greg Bluestein, Most States Have Not Compiled with Sex Offender Rules, DESERET
MORNING NEWS (Salt Lake City), Dec. 2, 2009, at A7.
73 NAT’L CONSORTIUM FOR JUSTICE INFO. & STATISTICS, supra note 72, at 1.
74 Id.
75 See OFFICE OF SEX OFFENDER SENTENCING, MONITORING, APPREHENDING, REGISTERING,
& TRACKING, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SORNA EXTENSIONS
GRANTED 1 (2010) [hereinafter SMART], http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/smart/pdfs/
SORNA_Extensions_Granted.pdf.  South Dakota applied for the extension but had substan-
tially complied by September 10, 2010.  South Dakota Press Release, supra note 63.
76 See SMART, supra note 75, at 1; Bluestein, supra note 72.
77 NAT’L CONSORTIUM FOR JUSTICE INFO. & STATISTICS, supra note 72, at 2.
78 United States v. Juvenile Male, 590 F.3d 924, 942 (9th Cir. 2010).
79 Id. at 927.
Summer 2011] NEVADA’S SEX OFFENDER LAWS 779
twenty-first birthday.”80  After the defendant had completed the two years of
detention and following the passage of the AWA, a court ordered the defendant
to register as a sex offender as a “special condition” of his supervision.81
Under SORNA, the defendant would have to register as a sex offender because,
if convicted as an adult, his acts would have amounted to aggravated sexual
assault.82  Judge Reinhardt held that the new requirements under SORNA result
in disadvantages to juvenile offenders that are “pervasive and severe . . . and in
light of the confidentiality that has historically attached to juvenile proceedings
. . . the retroactive application of SORNA’s provisions to former juvenile
offenders is punitive and, therefore, unconstitutional.”83
Ohio has attempted to implement some safeguards in response to concerns
about unfairness to juvenile offenders.84  Under Ohio’s new registration
scheme, juveniles have a right to a lawyer and a jury trial before the state enters
their names into the sex offender registry.85  Furthermore, juveniles are allowed
to ask a judge for declassification as a sex offender after three years.86  How-
ever, some Ohio attorneys are skeptical of these supposed protective measures
for juveniles.87  An attorney representing juvenile offenders argued that classi-
fying juveniles as sex offenders and forcing them to register “disincentivize[s]
children from doing well in treatment.”88
2. Other Constitutional Challenges
The AWA has the potential to affect adversely an enormous number of sex
offenders, who have already raised a variety of challenges, often alleging spe-
cifically that the controversial provisions of SORNA violate individual state
constitutions as well as the United States Constitution.89  These challenges
include violations of the Ex Post Facto Clause, procedural and substantive due
process, the Double Jeopardy Clause, the non-delegation doctrine, the Equal
Protection Clause, individuals’ rights to privacy, and prohibitions against cruel
and unusual punishment.90  The national judicial response to states’ attempts to
comply with SORNA has varied widely since the passage of the AWA.91
Several courts have upheld the constitutionality of SORNA.92  For
instance, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida in
United States v. Mason held that SORNA did not violate the Ex Post Facto
80 Id. at 928.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 927, 927 n.3.
83 Id. at 927.
84 Nash, supra note 66.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Frumkin, supra note 4, at 317; Rhiannon K. Thoreson, Sex Offender Residency Restric-
tions Are Not “OK”: Why Oklahoma Needs to Amend the Sex Offenders Registration Act, 44
TULSA L. REV. 617, 626 (2009).
90 Frumkin, supra note 4, at 317; Thoreson, supra note 89, at 626.
91 See Frumkin, supra note 4, at 317.
92 Id.
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Clause, reasoning that SORNA is a civil scheme—not a criminal penalty.93
Similarly, in Smith v. Doe, the United States Supreme Court upheld Alaska’s
version of SORNA as constitutional because it did not impose “punitive” sanc-
tions on offenders.94  The Court reasoned that the Alaska legislature did not
intend to impose criminal punishment, and thus the statute did not violate the
Ex Post Facto Clause.95  However, Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer dis-
sented, opining that the civil registration scheme and the resulting penalties
were punitive “in effect,” regardless of whether the intent of the legislature was
to the contrary.96
Offenders have also alleged that SORNA violates procedural due pro-
cess.97  In United States v. Lovejoy, the United States District Court for the
District of North Dakota held that SORNA did not violate a defendant’s proce-
dural due process rights, even though the defendant did not have specific notice
of the new federal registration requirements under the AWA.98  The court
found that the defendant had sufficient time to learn of the laws and already had
knowledged that he was required to register as a sex offender under state law.99
In United States v. Hinen, the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia held that the defendant had sufficient notice that failing to
register was against the law, even though he claimed to be unaware of the new
federal registration requirements under SORNA.100
However, the Fourth Circuit later reversed Hinen in United States v.
Hatcher.101  There, the court held that the federal registration requirements did
not apply to offenders at the time of the alleged crimes, because the Attorney
General of the United States had not yet entered the order declaring that the
AWA provisions applied retroactively.102  Thus, the court avoided the issue of
whether SORNA’s registration requirements violated the appellants’ procedural
due process rights.103
The Eighth Circuit explored the issue of procedural due process in United
States v. Aldrich.104  There, the court held that SORNA violated a defendant’s
due process rights because the defendant had no knowledge of the federal regis-
tration requirements or the increased criminal penalty for violations.105  The
court reasoned that the statute requires a mens rea; in order to face criminal
sanctions for failure to register, the offender must “knowingly fail[ ] to register
93 United States v. Mason, 510 F. Supp. 2d 923, 930 (M.D. Fla. 2007).
94 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105-06 (2003).
95 Id.
96 Id. at 112-14 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 115 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
97 Tracy Bateman Farrell, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Federal
Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 42 U.S.C.A. §16901 et seq., Its
Enforcement Provision, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2250, and Associated Regulations, 30 A.L.R. FED. 2d
213, §§ 13-15, at 240-45 (2008).
98 United States v. Lovejoy, 516 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1037 (D. N.D. 2007).
99 Id.
100 United States v. Hinen, 487 F. Supp. 2d 747, 754 (W.D. Va. 2007).
101 United States v. Hinen, 560 F.3d 222, 229 (4th Cir. 2009).
102 Id. at 223-24.
103 Id.
104 United States v. Aldrich, No. 8:07CR158, 2008 WL 427483, at *5 (D. Neb. Feb. 14,
2008).
105 Id.
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or update a registration as required by the Sex Offender Registration and Noti-
fication Act.”106  Because the defendant did not have the requisite mens rea due
to a lack of notice, imposing a criminal sanction against him for failing to
register would violate his constitutional due process rights.107
On September 30, 2009, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear Carr
v. United States, on appeal from the Seventh Circuit.108  The case raised ques-
tions involving SORNA’s retroactivity and criminal penalties relating to a sex
offender’s travel in interstate commerce.109  In a six-to-three vote, the Supreme
Court ruled on June 1, 2010, that a sex offender is not subject to SORNA’s
criminal penalties for failure to register unless the offender traveled between
states (and subsequently failed to register) after SORNA was enacted.110  How-
ever, the Court expressly declined to consider whether SORNA’s provisions
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause and whether a person who committed an
offense prior to SORNA’s enactment is subject to its provisions.111  Because
these questions have troubled lower courts across the nation, they are unlikely
to be answered consistently until the Supreme Court decides to consider them.
D. Nevada’s Compliance with SORNA
In an attempt to comply with SORNA, the Nevada legislature unani-
mously passed Assembly Bill (A.B.) 579, which Governor Jim Gibbons signed
into law in June 2007.112  The statute was scheduled to go into effect on July 1,
2008, well before SORNA’s three-year deadline of July 27, 2009.113  Only a
few states other than Nevada had attempted substantial compliance with
SORNA by January 2008.114
A.B. 579 made significant changes to Nevada’s sex offender registration
and community notification scheme, found in Chapter 179 of the Nevada
Revised Statutes (N.R.S.).115  According to the AWA, states must classify sex
offenders into tiers based exclusively on conviction type.116  Under the previ-
ous legislative scheme, Nevada used a risk-assessment model to classify
offenders into tiers based on numerous factors intended to provide an indication
of the offender’s risk of recidivism and threat to the community.117  In deter-
106 Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)(3) (2006).
107 Aldrich, 2008 WL 427483, at *5.
108 Carr v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 47, 48 (2009).
109 Carr v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2229, 2232-33 (2010).
110 Id. at 2240.
111 Id. at 2233, 2234 n.2.
112 AB579, NEVADA LEGISLATURE, http://www.leg.state.nv.us/74th/Reports/history.cfm?
ID=1169 (last visited Mar. 29, 2011) [hereinafter AB579 Summary]; see also Assemb. 579,
2007 Leg., 74th Sess. (Nev. 2007), available at http://www.leg.state.nv.us/74th/Bills/AB/
AB579_EN.pdf.
113 AB579 Summary, supra note 112; Assemb. 579 § 57.
114 Enniss, supra note 1, at 706.
115 NEV. REV. STAT. § 179D.010-.850 (2009); see also ACLU of Nev. v. Cortez Masto, 719
F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1260 (D. Nev. 2008) (noting major modifications made by A.B. 579).
116 42 U.S.C. § 16911(2)-(4) (2006).
117 Nevada Sex Offender Registry, supra note 21; see also Cortez Masto, 719 F. Supp. 2d at
1260 (“Prior to the enactment of these laws, sex offenders had been individually assessed
and classified based on psychological assessments focusing on whether the offenders pose a
risk to society and are likely to re-offend.”).
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mining the offender’s tier level, the risk-assessment model, like the requirement
under SORNA, took into account the nature of the conviction.  However,
unlike the requirement under SORNA, the risk-assessment model also included
a consideration of the seriousness of the offense, the number of offenses the
offender committed, and whether the offense was violent in nature.118  Moreo-
ver, under SORNA, Nevada must now list Tier I sex offenders who have com-
mitted specified crimes against minors on the sex offender registry website,
which Nevada’s previous registration scheme did not require.119
SORNA also requires offenders to provide more information for the state
to list in the national registry and on the national registry website than Nevada
law had previously required.120  Such information includes the name and
address of any employer the offender works for and any school in which the
offender enrolls, and a description of the offender’s vehicle and license plate
number.121  Prior to SORNA, Nevada did not post this specific information on
the website, except for the block number of the offender’s workplace or
school.122  Finally, SORNA would change the existing sex offender legislation
in Nevada by requiring sex offenders to register in person periodically.123  The
previous legislation in Nevada only required offenders to mail in a form to the
registration office in order to verify their information.124
Sex offenders recently challenged Nevada’s A.B. 579 in United States
District Court for the District of Nevada on several constitutional grounds.125
In American Civil Liberties Union of Nevada v. Masto, the plaintiffs moved for
summary judgment, asked the court to declare A.B. 579 and the similar Senate
Bill (S.B.) 471 unconstitutional, and requested that the court issue an injunction
on the bills.126  The plaintiffs alleged violations of procedural due process
rights, the ex post facto clause, double jeopardy, the contracts clause of the
United States and Nevada Constitutions, separation of powers in the Nevada
Constitution, and prohibitions against vague and ambiguous laws.127
The plaintiffs argued that the Assembly and Senate Bills forced back into
the system offenders “(1) whose crimes were committed in the distant past; (2)
who have been determined by the state of Nevada to be unlikely to re-offend;
and (3) who have complied with the law, attended counseling, and who have
not committed additional crimes.”128  The court held A.B. 579 and S.B. 471
unconstitutional, reasoning that the bills essentially tack on additional punish-
ment to an offender’s original sentence, and no procedural due process protec-
tions exist for an offender under the newly enacted system.129  Judge James C.
118 Nevada Sex Offender Registry, supra note 21.
119 Compare id., with 42 U.S.C. § 16918(a).
120 42 U.S.C. § 16918(a)-(c).
121 Id. § 161914(a)(4)-(6); id. § 16918(a)-(c); see also supra notes 27-31 and accompany-
ing text.
122 See Nevada Sex Offender Registry, supra note 21.
123 42 U.S.C. § 16916.
124 NEV. REV. STAT. § 179D.260 (2009) (repealed 2007).
125 ACLU of Nev. v. Cortez Masto, 719 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1259 (D. Nev. 2008).
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 1260.
129 Id.
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Mahan granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs and issued a permanent
injunction against A.B. 579 and S.B. 471.130  At the time of writing this Note,
the case was pending on appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit.131
In response to the district court’s entry of a permanent injunction, the
Nevada legislature passed A.B. 85, which temporarily repealed A.B. 579 and
S.B. 417.132  The legislature formed an advisory committee charged with stud-
ying the sex offender registration laws and proposing a solution to the contested
legislation.133  Pending the outcome of the Nevada Attorney General Office’s
appeal to the Ninth Circuit and the reconvening of the Nevada legislature in
February 2011, Nevada is utilizing the sex offender registration and notification
scheme in place prior to the passage of A.B. 579 and S.B. 417.134  The SMART
office granted Nevada the first of its two permissible one-year extensions to
comply with SORNA, which expired on July 26, 2010.135  Nevada again
applied to the SMART office for its second one-year extension, which the
SMART office granted.136  Nevada must now substantially implement
SORNA’s provisions by July 27, 2011, to avoid loss of funding.137
III. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF IMPLEMENTING SORNA
A. State Autonomy and Practicality of a National Registration System
One potential advantage of compliance with SORNA is that states would
collaborate to create a uniform national system rather than retaining individual
registration systems.138  Proponents of SORNA argue that stricter reporting and
registration requirements will provide more-comprehensive supervision of sex
offenders, which will result in lower recidivism rates.139  Proponents also argue
that a nationwide registry will help jurisdictions keep track of sex offenders as
they move between states, preventing the offenders from being lost in the sys-
tem or from moving to jurisdictions with less-strict registration laws, making it
easier for them to reoffend.140  Approximately one hundred thousand sex
offenders nationwide are not living in the jurisdictions in which they are regis-
tered or are supposed to register, and are thus eluding their states’ registration
130 Id.
131 Anthony V. Salerno & Elana Goldstein, Predators’ Net, L.A. LAW., June 2009, at 32,
34.
132 Assemb. 85, 2009 Leg., 75th Sess. (Nev. 2009), available at http://www.leg.state.nv.us/
Session/75th2009/Bills/AB/AB85_EN.pdf.
133 Id. §§ 5.3-5.6.
134 Op. Nev. Att’y Gen. No. 2010-01, at 3 (Apr. 8, 2010), available at http://ag.state.nv.us/
publications/ago/2010/AGO%202010-01.pdf.
135 NAT’L CONSORTIUM FOR JUSTICE INFO. & STATISTICS, supra note 72, at 40.
136 See SMART, supra note 75, at 1.
137 Id.
138 United States v. Hinen, 487 F. Supp. 2d 747, 756, 756 n.7 (W.D. Va. 2007); Farley,
supra note 4, at 480, 495.
139 See Farley, supra note 4, at 495; Lindsay A. Wagner, Note, Sex Offender Residency
Restrictions: How Common Sense Places Children at Risk, 1 DREXEL L. REV. 175, 187
(2009).
140 Hinen, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 755-56, 756 n.7.
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requirements.141  Additionally, the purpose of requiring states to post more-
detailed information about each sex offender on the national registry website is
to keep communities better informed about the offenders living in their area.142
However, unless most states comply substantially with SORNA’s require-
ments, the national registration system will be a failure.  The full benefits of a
national registration system will not exist if only a handful of states contribute
to its content.143  The result for compliant states is that they will spend
extraordinary amounts of money implementing a national registration system
that does not increase public safety.144  For those states, the benefits of non-
compliance with SORNA would far outweigh the detrimental results caused by
choosing to comply with the federal scheme.145
Electing not to implement SORNA’s provisions allows states to create,
modify, or maintain their own laws so as to avoid the constitutional problems
inherent in SORNA.146  It also allows states to choose between a risk-assess-
ment model or a conviction-based model to determine which offenders the state
will monitor more closely for longer periods.147  Additionally, the states will be
able to impose their own criminal sanctions for failure to comply with registra-
tion requirements.148  This could be potentially beneficial to states that already
have overcrowded correctional facilities and cannot afford an influx of sex
offenders who fail to meet federal registration guidelines, but who would not
face incarceration under current state law.
B. Public Safety
In response to arguments that the AWA furthers the goal of preventing
recidivism and increasing public safety, critics point out that sex offenders
actually have low rates of recidivism compared to other types of offenders.149
Due to the moral panic150 that occurred in the 1990s in response to a perceived
141 Bluestein, supra note 72.
142 See Enniss, supra note 1, at 713.
143 Frumkin, supra note 4, at 337-38.
144 JUSTICE POLICY INST., supra note 18, at 1; see also Antonio Planas, New Law on Sex
Offenders Poses Challenges, LAS VEGAS REV. J., Apr. 1, 2008, at B1, available at http://
www.lvrj.com/news/17182081.html.  Maggie McLetchie of the ACLU of Nevada is con-
cerned that, under SORNA, “The public will be endangered because law enforcement will
have to track a larger bulk of offenders, taking the focus off people who are most likely to
re-offend.” Id.
145 See generally Baron-Evans, supra note 4.
146 See Farley, supra note 4, at 497.
147 See Law & Criminal Justice Standing Comm., 2010-2011 Policies for the Jurisdiction of
the Law and Criminal Justice Committee: Adam Walsh Policy, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLA-
TURES, http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=773&tabs=855,27,671 (last visited Mar. 29,
2011).
148 Id.
149 Baron-Evans, supra note 4, at 359.
150 For a discussion about “moral panic” in response to the perceived increase in juvenile
crime, see ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE
109-17 (2008).
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increase in crimes against children,151 politicians and the public falsely
believed that sex offenders have high recidivism rates and therefore that stricter
legislation was necessary.152  However, studies have estimated the recidivism
rate for sex offenders to be only about 25 percent.153  Additionally, sex offend-
ers typically already know their victims.154  Thus, increased supervision by the
state and stricter residence requirements will not necessarily decrease sex
offenders’ access to their victims.155  For example, the inability of a sex
offender to live near an elementary school or a public park would not change
the fact that the sex offender already knows where his potential or past victims
reside, nor would it affect his access to those victims if they are close friends or
family members.156
Even worse, the frequent in-person registration requirements under
SORNA have the potential to increase, rather than decrease, recidivism
rates.157  A sex offender who fails to comply with registration requirements
faces the possibility of further incarceration, even if he has not committed any
new sex offenses.158  For many offenders, these requirements will create a seri-
ous hardship because they will be obligated to take days off work more fre-
quently in order to report at the registration office in person, which could lead
to loss of employment.159  One offender from Ohio, Gary Reece, emphasized
the difficulty that sex offenders will face if SORNA is implemented: “It’s a
tremendous burden . . . . Every 90 days you have to take off work and go
register—and if you miss once, you’re going back to jail.”160
C. Modification of the Tier Classification System
The risk-assessment model for classifying sex offenders into tiers is a bet-
ter approach than the SORNA method of assigning tiers based purely on type
of conviction.161  A risk-assessment model achieves the goal of keeping the
151 Elizabeth Garfinkle, Coming of Age in America: The Misapplication of Sex-Offender
Registration and Community-Notification Laws to Juveniles, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 163, 164-74
(2003).
152 Farley, supra note 4, at 492.
153 Id.; see also Baron-Evans, supra note 4, at 357 (“Studies, including studies by the
Department of Justice, show that the vast majority of sex offenders do not reoffend, that sex
offender treatment is effective, and that community support and stability are essential to
rehabilitation.”).
154 Thoreson, supra note 89, at 637.
155 Frumkin, supra note 4, at 350 (“‘[M]ore than 90 percent of child sex abuse is committed
by someone the child knows and trusts[,]’ and because an offender lives far from a potential
victim does not mean he or she is effectively prevented from reaching that victim.”) (second
alteration in original).
156 Id.
157 See Bluestein, supra note 72.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Enniss, supra note 1, at 716; Farley, supra note 4, at 490-91; Thoreson, supra note 89,
at 644; Kari White, Where Will They Go? Sex Offender Residency Restrictions as Modern-
Day Banishment, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 161, 187 (2008).
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highest-risk and most-dangerous offenders under the strictest governmental
supervision.162
A conviction-based system, on the other hand, would unnecessarily force
low-risk sex offenders to register.  According to Maggie McLetchie, a staff
attorney with the American Civil Liberties Union of Nevada (ACLU of
Nevada), under SORNA “it is clear that a huge number of people are going to
go back into the system, people deemed by the state who are not likely to re-
offend.”163  If the tier classification system was implemented in Nevada, the
number of Tier III offenders, who require lifetime state supervision, could rise
from 127 to 2,000 in Southern Nevada alone.164
Another problem is that legislation requiring the state to post more
offender information on the registry websites actually hinders rather than fur-
thers the goal of preventing recidivism.  More information on the registry web-
sites leads to increased difficulty with securing housing and employment,
which, in return, reduces the chances that an offender will comply with report-
ing requirements.165  It also unnecessarily exposes offenders (and those who
live, work, or go to school with them) to potential harassment and vigilante
attacks.166
The ACLU of Nevada has taken on a client whose situation highlights the
retroactive registration problems the provisions in SORNA create for offenders
forced to re-enter the system.167  The client, a reputable member of his commu-
nity and a grandfather, could be “treated like a dangerous pedophile for com-
mitting statutory rape at age 17 back in 1960,” even though he has completed
his sentence and his original period of registration is over.168  Under the regis-
try provisions of SORNA, he and other offenders unlikely to recidivate must
provide personal information for the state to post on websites that could result
in themselves and their “families fac[ing] social ostracism, losing their jobs,
and even possible vigilante violence.”169
As a result of these issues, approximately one-half of the states, including
Nevada, continue to use a risk-assessment model to classify sex offenders into
162 Farley, supra note 4, at 490-91; Thoreson, supra note 89, at 644.
163 Planas, supra note 144.
164 Id.
165 Farley, supra note 4, at 492, 494 (“Homelessness and joblessness not only makes the
offenders more difficult for law enforcement to supervise, but also create recidivism and
threaten public safety.  The stigma and harassment of former offenders diminish the likeli-
hood of a successful transition back into society.”).
166 Id. at 492, 494; Frumkin, supra note 4, at 343-44 (“By virtue of SORNA’s permissive
exemptions, sex offenders (and their places of employment and education) are currently in a
worse position in terms of safety and public exposure then they were prior to AWA’s enact-
ment.”); Richard G. Wright, Sex Offender Post-Incarceration Sanctions: Are There Any Lim-
its?, 34 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 17, 30-31 (2008) (“[O]ne of the most
disturbing trends has been the use of internet notification to find, track down, and murder
registered sex offenders.  Although these cases are infrequent, they nonetheless demonstrate
the level of extremism society has developed toward sex offenders.”).
167 Phil Hooper, ACLU of NV Wins Permanent Injunction Against Retroactive Enforcement
of New Sex Offender Laws, ACLU NEV. (Sept. 10, 2008, 2:26 PM), http://www.aclunv.org/
aclu-nv-wins-permanent-injunction-against-retroactive-enforcement-new-sex-offender-laws.
168 Id.
169 Id.
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a tier-based system.170  In fact, several states cite the requirement to switch
from a risk-assessment model to a conviction-based model as one of the major
barriers to compliance with SORNA.171  Although the jurisdictions have some
discretion over certain provisions of SORNA, the tier classification system is
not one of them, and failure to use this system results in the jurisdiction failing
to comply substantially with SORNA.172
D. Problems with the Juvenile Registration Requirements under SORNA
For many states, one of the major obstacles to implementation of
SORNA’s provisions is the requirement that juvenile offenders comply with the
same registration guidelines as adult offenders.173  Prior to SORNA, many
states’ registration schemes did not require juvenile offenders to register as sex
offenders, and those that did often limited registration to juveniles over a cer-
tain age.174  In her article that explores the effect of the SORNA requirements
on juvenile offenders, Brittany Enniss notes, “For the past 100 years, American
Law has treated juveniles differently from adult offenders with the idea that
youth do not have fully developed mental capacities, are less blameworthy, and
thus more amenable to rehabilitation than are adults.”175  SORNA’s juvenile
offender registration and reporting requirements contradict these important and
long-held policies.176
Under SORNA, juvenile offenders face even more severe consequences
than adult offenders do.177  Requiring states to post a juvenile offender’s per-
sonal information and photograph on a public website opens the door to social
ostracism, vigilante attacks, and predation by adult sex offenders looking to
exploit minors.178  According to Elizabeth Letoutneau, finding gainful employ-
ment after reaching adulthood or even graduating from school will also be sub-
stantial obstacles to juvenile sex offenders, and children unable to obtain an
education or a job will be marginalized by society and therefore will be more
likely to commit crime than they otherwise would have been.179  Furthermore,
at least one study of juvenile sex offenders shows that such offenders have low
rates of committing subsequent sexual offenses.180  Finally, critics of the juve-
nile offender registration requirement believe that parents will be less likely to
report juvenile sex offenses for fear of the effects the registration requirements
will have on the juvenile, ultimately precluding the opportunity for justice for
170 Baron-Evans, supra note 4, at 357.
171 NAT’L CONSORTIUM FOR JUSTICE INFO. & STATISTICS, supra note 72, at 2.
172 SORNA Guidelines, supra note 10, at 38053.
173 NAT’L CONSORTIUM FOR JUSTICE INFO. & STATISTICS, supra note 72, at 2.
174 Thoreson, supra note 89, at 620.
175 Enniss, supra note 1, at 707.
176 Id. at 706-07 (“There is something in our senses that acknowledges the vulnerability and
the differences between juvenile offenders and adult offenders.  The glaring problem with
Adam’s Law is that it fails to take into account those differences.”).
177 See id. at 710.
178 Id. at 710-11; Nancy G. Calley, Juvenile Sex Offenders and Sex Offender Legislation:
Unintended Consequences, FED. PROBATION, Dec. 2008, at 37, 38.
179 Ennis, supra note 2, at 710.
180 Wright, supra note 166, at 27.
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the victim of the sexual offense and for rehabilitation for the juvenile sex
offender.181
In Nevada, it appears that some legislators were unaware that their
attempted implementation of SORNA’s requirements created consequences for
juvenile offenders.182  Former U.S. Congresswoman Dina Titus, a Democratic
State Senator from Las Vegas at the time A.B. 579 and S.B. 471 were being
debated, said she does not recall discussing the implications for juveniles dur-
ing Nevada Assembly hearings.183  She admitted, however, that it “might be an
unintended consequence [of implementing the provisions of SORNA].”184  A
clinical social worker emphasized just how severe these unintended conse-
quences on juvenile offenders could be, saying, “These children literally stand
no chance at any form of rehabilitation . . . .  [The consequences] are going to
destroy kids.  There’s going to be absconding.  There’s going to be
suicides.”185
E. Financial Incentives and Costs Associated with Substantial Compliance
The detrimental effects of non-compliance to states are mostly financial in
nature.186  Although former director of the SMART Office, Laura L. Rogers,
supports the implementation of SORNA, she admits that jurisdictions are going
to need additional resources in order to achieve substantial compliance: “there
is a significant hurdle to substantial implementation that can be solved by Con-
gress: the lack of funding.  Congress should provide resources to support the
jurisdictions and the SMART Office in their ongoing efforts.”187
States have an incentive to comply with SORNA because compliance
allows them not only to continue to receive federal funding under the AWA, but
also to have the opportunity to receive additional funds that may be available as
a result of other states’ non-compliance.188  There has been a national trend of
states choosing not to comply with the federal guidelines and forfeiting the 10
percent annual funding.189  Due to current economic hardships across the
United States, many states have chosen not to implement the registration
scheme under SORNA because of the high costs associated with implementa-
tion and maintenance.190  Thus, states that do comply will receive a higher
amount of funding due to other states’ noncompliance.
The costs to comply with SORNA outweigh the federal funding a state
will receive for complying.  States electing non-compliance with SORNA will
181 Enniss, supra note 1, at 711; Abigail Goldman, Young, but ‘Predators’ for Life: New
Sex-offender Laws, Meant to Protect, May Instead Ruin Lives and Increase Risks, LAS
VEGAS SUN, Jan. 6, 2008, at 1, available at http://lasvegassun.com/news/2008/jan/06/young-
but-predators-for-life/.
182 Goldman, supra note 181.
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Salerno & Goldstein, supra note 131, at 32.
187 Barriers to Timely Compliance Hearing, supra note 14, at 51.
188 Farley, supra note 4, at 495 (“States that have complied with the AWA will receive full
Byrne Grant funds and may also receive reallocated funds from non-complying states.”).
189 Baron-Evans, supra note 4, at 358.
190 Id.
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not have to expend funds for the start-up costs of implementing the national
registration system, which are far greater than the federal funding states will
lose by not complying.191  For example, it was estimated that the implementa-
tion of SORNA’s registration system would cost California $59,287,816.192
The potential federal funding that California might lose due to non-compliance
with SORNA, on the other hand, is only $2,187,682 annually.193  At that rate, it
would take California twenty-seven years before the annual federal funding
would equal the costs of implementation, and that is assuming: (1) that the state
would not have to spend any of the federal funds on maintenance of the new
national system, and (2) that the costs to the state of maintaining the national
system would be equal to or less than the current cost of maintaining the state’s
existing sex offender registration and notification system.194
Similarly, in Nevada, the estimated cost of implementing the national sys-
tem would be $4,160,944 and the federal funding that would be lost by not
complying equals only $180,810 annually.195  In the aforementioned SEARCH
survey that questioned states about their plans to comply substantially with
SORNA, Nevada responded with several concerns, including the cost of imple-
menting the national registration system:
We anticipate the costs to make the changes will exceed the amount of grant funding
available to us.  Given our state’s budget shortfall, we are unsure where we would get
the funding to make up the anticipated difference between the costs of the project and
the amount of our grant.196
Nevada’s statement highlights a major concern for states electing to comply
with SORNA and continue to receive the federal funding—the annual federal
funding would likely need to be allocated toward maintenance of the registra-
tion system itself, and that funding could easily fall short of the total funding
the state needs to maintain the new national registration system.197  Under that
scenario, Nevada would be forced to use its own money, in addition to the
federal funding, to maintain the system.  Prior to the AWA, states generally
allocated these funds to law enforcement and crime prevention; substantial
compliance with SORNA would thus result in the state allocating fewer funds
to these important state functions and reallocating them to maintenance of the
national sex offender registry and online database.198
Moreover, stricter sex offender registration laws result in increased super-
vision of a higher number of offenders whom the state must monitor for a
191 Farley, supra note 4, at 497; Frumkin, supra note 4, at 337; see also JUSTICE POLICY
INST., supra note 18, at 2.
192 JUSTICE POLICY INST., supra note 18, at 2.
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 NAT’L CONSORTIUM FOR JUSTICE INFO. & STATISTICS, supra note 72, at 40.
197 Frumkin, supra note 4, at 337 (“In fact, a recent study by the Justice Policy Institute
focusing on cost-benefit analysis discussed that some ‘states have found that implementing
SORNA in their state is far more costly than the penalties for not being in compliance.’  The
study points to a further concern that by devoting a majority of resources to maintaining the
registry, the goal of targeting serious offenders might be difficult to achieve.”).
198 See Salerno & Goldstein, supra note 131, at 32.
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longer period of time.199  For example, when Nevada was attempting to comply
substantially with SORNA in July 2008, the number of Tier III offenders was
expected to increase by more than 1,500 percent in southern Nevada alone.200
Thus, the classification requirements under SORNA would create a greater
demand on state resources and funding.201
Finally, some critics of SORNA suggest that the public would be safer and
better served if the funding that the state would otherwise spend on implement-
ing a “stricter” national sex offender registration system was instead spent on
offender rehabilitation and community education about sexual offenses.202
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION
Due to the constitutional issues, financial challenges, and risks to public
safety that substantial compliance with SORNA creates, Nevada should aban-
don its attempt to comply substantially with the SORNA’s provisions.  It
should refuse to implement a conviction-based tier classification system and
instead, if the legislature deems it necessary, amend the existing sex offender
registration scheme under N.R.S. 179.  Non-compliance would save Nevada the
exorbitant costs of implementation203 and allow the state to devote its already-
limited resources to monitoring only the highest-risk offenders.  Furthermore,
although a national registration system would likely more effectively track sex
offenders who travel interstate,204 the success of such a system ultimately
depends on cooperation among the states, an unlikely prospect in the near
future considering the vast majority of states have not substantially complied
with SORNA despite having had five years to do so.
There are, however, certain provisions of SORNA that Nevada could
incorporate into the existing sex offender registration and notification scheme
that have the potential to increase public safety while avoiding the costs of
implementing a national, classification-based system.  For example, the peri-
odic in-person verification requirement under SORNA decreases the likelihood
that an offender will be able to misrepresent his or her whereabouts and living
arrangements.205  Although requiring in-person verification would necessarily
increase administrative costs, it is still a viable alternative because the number
of offenders required to register would remain the same, and thus the added
costs would not be overwhelming, and such a provision could potentially
increase public safety.  Nevada currently requires verification using only a
mail-in form,206 which creates the potential for abuse.  An offender could
199 Planas, supra note 144.
200 Id.
201 Frumkin, supra note 4, at 337.
202 Id. at 350.
203 JUSTICE POLICY INST., supra note 18, at 2.
204 Barriers to Timely Compliance Hearing, supra note 14, at 283 (statement of Evelyn
Fortier, vice president for policy of the Rape, Abuse & Incest National Network).
205 Christina Horst, The 2006 Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act: What Does It
Mean for Your Law Enforcement Agency?, POLICE CHIEF, Nov. 2007, at 18, 18, available at
http://policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display&article_id=1317&
issue_id=112007.
206 NEV. REV. STAT. § 179D.260 (2006) (repealed 2008).
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represent on the form that he currently resides in Nevada, but in reality could
spend all or most of his time in another state without registering in that state.
By requiring periodic, in-person verification at reasonable intervals, Nevada
could be more confident that the information it collects from offenders is accu-
rate, thereby increasing the safety of the communities in which the offenders
reside and preventing sex offenders from evading registration requirements.
Finally, Nevada should not adopt the provisions of SORNA that require certain
juvenile offenders to register.
Additionally, Nevada could collect more information about offenders, as
SORNA’s provisions suggest.207  For example, SORNA requires offenders to
provide their jurisdictions with DNA samples and fingerprints.208  Collecting
this type of information could help increase public safety by making it easier
for law enforcement to identify registered sex offenders who reoffend.  Further-
more, collecting this information would not pose a serious threat to sex offend-
ers because it would not be available to the public; thus, it does not have the
potential to lead to vigilante attacks or other harassment of offenders and those
with whom they associate, nor would it pose a further barrier to a sex
offender’s employment or housing search.209  Similarly, Nevada could collect
the social security numbers of sex offenders to keep on file as SORNA sug-
gests, in order to keep track of their activities within the state and outside of the
state.  But, as required by SORNA, such information should not be published
on the website registry or made available to the public in any way.210
Nevada certainly should not adopt the provisions of SORNA relating to
juvenile offender registration.  Such provisions are contrary to the public policy
of encouraging juvenile offenders to rehabilitate and integrate successfully into
society after reaching adulthood.  Furthermore, requiring juvenile registration
fails to take into account that juvenile sex offenders in general have a low
likelihood of committing subsequent sex offenses and that their motivations for
committing sexual offenses are often very different from adult offenders’ moti-
vations.211  As the National Conference of State Legislatures has proposed,
Nevada should exercise its power to define which, if any, juvenile offenders
should qualify as sex offenders after reaching adulthood and determine the
appropriate course of action for supervising such offenders, rather than relying
on the conviction-based tier classification SORNA provides.212
V. CONCLUSION
Congress’s enactment of SORNA opened the door to a plethora of consti-
tutional challenges that the judiciary must now resolve at the federal district,
appellate, and Supreme Court levels.213  This influx of legal challenges has led
to inconsistent opinions that have confused past and current sex offenders,
207 42 U.S.C. § 16918(a) (2006).
208 Id. § 16914(b)(5)-(6).
209 See Farley, supra note 4, at 492, 494.
210 42 U.S.C. § 16918(b)(2).
211 Enniss, supra note 1, at 697, 708.
212 Law & Criminal Justice Standing Comm., supra note 147.
213 See supra Parts II.B II.C.
792 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11:770
attorneys, and legislators alike in Nevada and in other states.214  SORNA also
requires a less-effective method for classifying offenders into tier levels,215
which has the counter-productive effect of decreasing public safety216 while
increasing state spending.217  The provisions of SORNA that require juvenile
sex offenders to follow the similar registration guidelines as adult sex offenders
and provide information for the state to post on registry websites is contrary to
the policy of encouraging juvenile sex offender rehabilitation.218  Finally, the
detriment caused to states by the exorbitant cost of complying substantially
with SORNA far outweighs the benefits of compliance,219 particularly when
the national trend among individual states has been non-compliance with
SORNA.
Due to the current budgetary crisis in Nevada, the Nevada legislature
should not attempt to comply substantially with SORNA.  Rather, the legisla-
ture should amend Nevada’s existing regulatory scheme to impose stricter regu-
lation of only those offenders who pose the highest risk of committing
subsequent sex offenses.
214 See Planas, supra note 144 (quoting Maggie McLetchie of ACLU of Nevada: “Nobody
is clear on how to apply the law.”).
215 See SORNA Guidelines, supra note 10, at 38052-54.
216 See Baron-Evans, supra note 4, at 358; Planas, supra note 144.
217 See JUSTICE POLICY INST., supra note 18, at 2.
218 Enniss, supra note 1, at 706-07.
219 See generally Baron-Evans, supra note 4. See also JUSTICE POLICY INST., supra note
18, at 2.
